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A Response to D.A.J. Richards' Defense of
Freewheeling Constitutional Adjudication
RAOUL BERGER*
We must take off this vail and colour of words, which make
a shew of being something, and in truth are nothing. Chief
Justice Vaughan (1671)**
In the six years that have elapsed since publication of my Government by
Judiciary,' "replying" to Raoul Berger, an activist remarks, has become "a
cottage industry."2 Survival under an incessant barrage suggests that my thesis
has abiding merit.' Now comes a lawyer-philosopher, Professor D.A.J.
Richards, who removes analysis from the cottage to the empyrean of
philosophy.4 But it is a newly-tailored philosophy which merely cloaks his
own predilections. As was said of his patron saint, Ronald Dworkin,
the account of human rights Dworkin offers turns out to be little more
than a convoluted ideology supporting precisely those reactions to current
policy issues that a conventional liberal academician is likely to have.
• A.B., University of Cincinnati, 1932; J.D., Northwestern University, 1935; L.L.M., Har-
vard University, 1938; L.L.D., University of Michigan, 1978.
** Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (1671).
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JuDicIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF Tim FOURTEENTH
AIDMENT (1977).
2. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 745,
753 (1983). "Berger's book stimulated an explosion of academic interest in the framers' intent
and its significance for constitutional adjudication." Id.
3. Eric Foner, commenting on the ongoing attacks on Stanley Elkins' SLAvERY (1959), wrote,
"[i]n the writing of history, refutation.., is often the sincerest form of flattery. Mr. Elkins'
thesis, for example, remains important precisely because a generation of scholars has directed
its energies to overturning it." Foner, The Slaveholder as Factory Owner (Book Review), N.Y.
Times, May 23, 1982, § 11, at 11, 27.
"The old guard ... said with confidence that the Jamesian propositions could hardly have
been taken seriously, a conclusion that was somewhat flawed by the long and serious arguments
written to prove it." J. BAgzuN, A STROLL WIH Wntum JAMES 2 (1983).
4. Richards, Book Review, 71 CAUP. L. Rnv. 1372 (1983).
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One might expect, however, that he would not so cavalierly dress up his
own opinions as "natural rights" or call.the culture-bound process by
which he arrives at them "Philosophy."-
Not the least singular aspect of Richards' approach is the almost total
absence of reference to long-standing case law or established canons of inter-
pretation which run counter to his theorizing. Instead he offers a melange
of anthropology and like social sciences, couched in murky rhetoric that il-
lustrates a fellow activist's plaint: "Constitutional scholars have, of late, talked
mainly to each other; the time has come for us to look outside ourselves to
the audience of judges, lawyers, legislators and the public,"'6 to the vast bulk
of whom, like to Chief Justice Marshall, "abstract theorizing was never
congenial." 7 Richards found that the argument of -my 430-page book could
"be easily summarized. ' 8 Would that I could say as much for his 26-page
article. Let -one example of his fogginess suffice: as a preliminary to the task
of constitutional interpretation, he says
consider the interpretation of walking down the street. Our interpretation
of this action rests on a form of holistic, viz. nonreductive explanation
in which such factors as the person's rationality, beliefs, desires, capacities,
and the like appear as mutually interdependent variables.'
That is enough to inhibit a person from taking another step. Of such writing
we may say with Stephen Jay Gould, "difficult, convoluted writing may simply
be fuzzy, not'deep. . . The essence ...can still be stated with every day
words.""
But Richards is not at home with everyday words. Thus he repeatedly charges
me with being a "strict constructionist,"" a position from which I am poles
5. Pangle, Rediscovering Rights, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1978, at 157, 159, 160.
6. Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 579, 580 (1§83). Jacques Barzun observed that "[i]f from love of abstracting new conceptual
terms are substituted for common ones, it often happens that the power of words to direct thought
approaches zero." BARZUN, supra note 3, at 60.
7. F. FRANKFURTER, TiE COMMERCE CLAUSE 15 (1937). Our legal system derives from the
English who did not start with a principle from which to derive particulars, but decided rather
on a case-to-case basis, extracting principles from those decisions. Henry James wrote of the
Englishman that "hair-splitting is the occupation he most despises. There is always a little of
the Dr. Johnson in him, and Dr. Johnson would have had woefully little patience with that
tendency to weigh moonbeams." James, Hawthorne, in THE SHOCK OF RECOONnTON 465 (E.
Wilson ed. 1955).
8. Richards, supra note 4, at 1372.
9. Id. at 1375. As was said of a passage by Clifford Geertz, one of Richards' authorities,
see id. at 1377 n.24, "[lit makes us work very hard for a modest intellectual yield .-. . . Such
recondite language and baroque construction force us to read the passage over and over before
we can tease any meaning out of it." Robinson, Book Review, N.Y.'Times, Sept. 25, 1983,
at 11', 35.
10. Derman, Book Review, BOSTON REv., Aug. 1983, at 37. William Jmes was "impatient
with the awful abstract rigmarole in which our philosophers obscure the truth," "regarded the
failure to write intelligibly a fundamental flaw in any vision," and considered Hegel was "beset
with a perverse preference for the use of technical and logical jargon." BARZUN, supra note
3, at 125, 133, 137.
11. Richards, supra note 4, at 1378-79.
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removed. A "strict construction is one which limits the application of the
provision ... to cases clearly described by the words used. It is called, also,
literal."' I2 It is the activists, however, who seek to give the words of the four-
teenth amendment "literal" construction-"equal" means equal, never mind
that the Framers incontrovertibly intended to exclude suffrage from the
amendment. 3 With the Supreme Court, reflecting a centuries-old practice,
I have ever maintained that the text must yield to the unmistakable intention
of the Draftsmen, 4 and therefore concluded that in reversing the Framers'
exclusion of suffrage in the "one man-one vote" cases the Court flouted the
will of the framers.S Nowhere is the Court authorized to reverse their deter-
mination. That view is poles removed from "strict construction."
12. BouviER's LAW DIcnoNARY 647 (1st ed. 1914).
13. For documentation, see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 52-68. For activist acknowledgement
of the exclusion, see Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. Rav.
533, 554 n.142 (1983); Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimina-
tion Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80
MicH. L. REv. 462, 472 n.46 (1982); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 234 n.115 (1980); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of
Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 681, 705 (1979); Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking
and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intention " Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGs CONST.
L.Q. 403, 406 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 581 (1978); Abraham,
Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467-68 (1979); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
685, 687 (1978).
14. "A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and within
its meaning, though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law." Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903). Judge Learned Hand stated that the "manifest" legislative
purpose "overrides even the explicit words used." Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445
(2d Cir. 1959).
15. For documentation, see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 30-31, 52-68. Justice Harlan reminded
the Court that its reapportionment decisions were "made in the face of irrefutable and still
unanswered history to the contrary." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring). Activist Louis Lusky refers to Harlan's "irrefutable and unrefuted demonstra-
tion to that effect." Lusky, supra note 13, at 406. See also Abraham, supra note 13, at 467-68;
Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contradiction vs. Abuse by Ex-
pansion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 453 (1979); Nathanson, supra note 13, at 581. Gerald
Gunther wrote,
[Ethe ultimate justification for the Reynolds ruling is hard, if not impossible, to set
forth in constitutionally legitimate terms. It rests, rather, on the view that courts
are authorized to step in when injustices exist and other institutions fail to act.
That is a dangerous-and I think illegitimate-prescription for judicial action.
Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots and Prospects, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 817, 825. Robert Bork wrote, "[t]he principle of one man, one vote ... runs counter
to the text of the fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification
and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented
the new formula." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
17, 18 (1971).
Compare with such materials Richards' statement that "focusing on the application at the
time of adoption may constitutionalize one among several historically competing views of ap-
plication." Richards, supra note 4, at 1389-90 (emphasis added). Except for a handful of radicals,
opposition to Negro suffrage was overwhelming. John Bingham, a quondam radical, led the
fight to admit Tennessee notwithstanding its Constitution made no provision for Negro suffrage.
His opponents were defeated in the House by 125 to 12, in the Senate by 34 to 4. For details,
see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 59-60, 79.
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Richards has no sympathy with democratic self-government. To make room
for his philosophy he attacks such a fundamental presupposition as popular
sovereignty, which he acknowledges "has long enjoyed a central place in in-
tuitive moral conceptions of constitutional legitimacy. '"'6 Because the Court
declined to hold death penalties unconstitutional per se, Richards asserts that
it was a "serious constitutional misjudgment" on the part of the majority
(of seven) to suppose that judgment "turned on popular sentiment or some
kind of judicial divination about conventional morality." 7 That, he considers,
is an abdication of their duty "to exercise their own independent consciences,"
not "in obedience to the fictive denotations of the Founders or the imagined
demands of public opinion."' 8 The "imagined demands of public opinion"
exemplifies the unreliability of Richards' pronunciamentos. In the wake of
the unprecedented Furman v. Georgia'9 there was a stunning backlash, "a
virtual stampede of State reenactments" of death penalties by thirty-five
states." Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens handsomely acknowledged that
this had "undercut the assumption on which Furman rested": "[I]t is now evi-
dent that a large proportion of American society continues to regard [such
penalties] as ... appropriate and necessary criminal sanction[s]." 2 ' For Richards
this derives from "populist retributivism, itself compounded of fear and
ignorance." 22 And he would not have-the Court "track the retributive thirst
of the American public." ' 23 So populist retributivism is not "imagined." In
fact, he has not sorted out his ideas; he cites Dworkin's statement that "in-
terpretative questions ultimately appeal to morality of the political
community," 2 and charges that "Berger ignores the ways in which the moral
growth of the community must inevitably shape the elaboration of the abstract
normative intentions of ... the eighth and fourteenth amendments.1 2 5 Thus
Richards appeals to the morality of the community but condemns its specific
manifestation-adherence to death penalties, and asks the Court to transform
the "conventional morality.''26 In fact he prefers his own aspirations to those
of the people and the Court and urges the Court to effectuate them. 27
16. Richards, supra note 4, at 1384.
17. Id. at 1397; see also infra text accompanying note 139.
18. Richards, supra note 4, at 1397 (emphasis added).
19. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 65 (1980).
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976). See also infra note 63. Nevertheless Richards
criticizes me for questioning "the legitimacy of the judiciary finding that a form of punishment
that the Founders regarded as valid is no longer consistent with the eighth or fourteenth amend-
ments because the moral values of the people today reject it." Richards, supra note 4, at 1394.
Where did the American people reject death penalties?
22. Richards, supra note 4, at 1398.
23. Id. at 1397.
24. Id. at 1378 n.26.
25. Id. at 1388-89.
26. He calls for a judicial "transformation of American conventional morality in the ethically
required way that [his] constitutional principle demands." Id. at 1398.
27. See infra text accompanying note 139. He is critical of my rejection of Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 489 (1954) and its progeny "whose political morality [Berger] esteems not-
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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Berger, Richards recounts, views popular sovereignty "as the basic postulate
of constitutional democracy" so that judicial wandering "outside the scope
of what the people intended betrays the governing rationale of constitutional
government-that the people should rule." 28 According to this view, "the
people, the fount of political legitimacy, imposed constitutional limits on the
state," using language as they understood it "at the time it was drafted and
approved." This, Richards asserts, "derives from an . . . indefensible
positivistic conception of popular sovereignty," posing the problem, "how
there can be any legal limits on the sovereign." 29 That may baffle a philosopher
but presents no problem to an historian. The Founders did not regard the
state as sovereign; "if sovereignty had to reside somewhere in the state-and
the best political science of the eighteenth century said it did-then many
Americans concluded that it must reside only in the people-at-large." ' 30 John
Adams referred to the prevalent idea in the Continental Congress-the people
were the "Source of all Authority and Original of all Power."'" James Wilson
pointed out that "all Government originates from the People," a "[mlaxim
widely accepted by almost every one." 32 " 'It is a [m]axim,' proclaimed the
Massachusetts General Court in January 1776, 'that, in every Government,
there must exist, Somewhere, a Supreme, Sovereign, absolute and uncon-
trollable Power; But this power resides, always in the body of the People.' ,33
Gordon Wood comments that this was no "vague abstraction of political
science" but had "gained a verity in American hands" not imagined by Euro-
pean radicals. 34 James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania Ratification Con-
vention that "'in all governments . . . there must be a power established
from which there is no appeal, and which is therefore called absolute, supreme
and uncontrollable. The only question,' .... 'is where that power is lodged?'
... The supreme power, [he answered]. .. 'resides in the PEOPLE, as the
fountain of government.'.... '[They can delegate it in such proportions, to
such bodies, on such terms, and under such limitations, as they think pro-
per.' Unless the people were considered as vitally sovereign, declared Wilson
withstanding their constitutional illegitimacy," Richards, supra note 4, at 1373, oblivious to the
need for suppressing personal predilections in dispassionate scholarly inquiry. As long ago as
1942, I refused to make my predilections the test of constitutionality, Berger, Constructive Con-
tempt: A Post-Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1942), whereas my philosopher-critic manifestly
is the slave of his predilections.
28. Richards, supra note 4, at 1372-73.
29. Id. at 1383 (emphasis added). "Indefensible" is a characteristic Richardsian exaggera-
tion, and to say the least, is unphilosophical.
30. 0. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 382 (1969).
31. Id. at 329.
32. Id. at 330.
33. Id. at 363. For similar sentiments in North Carolina, see id. at 364. By 1788 this was
seen by Noah Webster to be "a fundamental maxim of American politics . . .' the sovereign
power resides in the people." Id. at 377.
34. Id. at 362.
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... 'we shall never be able to understand the principle on which this system
was constructed.' "3 Judicial review was not designed to rise above this power;
it "only supposes," said Hamilton, that "the power of the people is superior"
to that of the judiciary and the legislature. 36
The historical answer to the jurisprudential difficulty "in explaining how
there can be any legal limits on the sovereign" is thrust aside by Richards
because it
fictionalize[s] a kind of sovereign who imposes limits on the state, but is
itself illimitable, namely, the people, or popular sovereignty. But, as the
more perceptive positivists have always recognized, such a reading of the
facts of American constitutional government is strained indeed, a far cry
from the European centralized bureaucracy and British parliamentary
supremacy which positivist theories have more naturally explained."
This richly exemplifies how delusory is a philosophy not rooted in the facts.
The supremacy of Parliament had first been rejected in favor of the colonists'
own assemblies, and then they withheld that supremacy from their own
legislatures. 38 As James Iredell pointed out, the Founders rejected the con-
ventional British "theory of the necessity of the legislature being absolute
in all cases." ' 39 In so doing they did not reject the concept of sovereignty,
they merely relocated it, concluding that "it must reside only in the
people-at-large." ° To label this "a futile and disfiguring search for or inven-
tion of a fictionalized sovereign" is to prefer fantasy to fact."' If popular
sovereignty was a fiction, the Founders acted on it, and as Charles Evans
Hughes said in a similar case, "it matters not whether they were accurate
in their understanding of the Great Charter, for the point is what the col-
onists thought it meant." 2 Nor does it dispose of "popular sovereignty" to
label it an "invention"; so too was judicial review itself. The Framers set
out to fashion a novel system of self-government, and "invention" was the
order of the day.4 3
35. Id. at 530; see id., 344-89 (emphasis added).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
37. Richards, supra note 4, at 1383.
38. WOOD, supra note 30, at 351-52, 371, 374-75.
39. Id. at 462. Apparently Richards believes that interpretivists consider the Founders as
"sovereign" for he refers to !'Founders or some other sovereign," and then concludes that "in
conflicts between judicial convention and the Founders' intent it is the former, not the latter,
which should govern." Richards, supra note 4, at 1384. The logic of his deduction is not clear
to me. The Framers' intent is given weight under the age-old rule that such intention prevails
even over the letter. See supra note 14. Weight attaches to what the Framers did because they
were delegates of the people, who then ratified the Constitution produced by the Framers. In
short, "the legal supremacy of the Constitution," text and original understanding, "is due to
its being the ordinance of the sovereign will of the people." E. CORWIN, Ta TwILGrr OF THE
SUPREME COURT 106-07 (1934). See also Berger, Lawyering v. Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies,
9 U. DAYTON L. Rav. 171 (1984) at text accompanying notes 142-54.
40. WOOD, supra note 30, at 382.
41. Richards, supra note 4, at 1384.
42. C. HuoHs, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (1928).
43. Madison stated that the Founders "reared the fabrics of government which have no model
[Vol. 59:339
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Richards' invocation of Madison's Federalist No. 10 against a "purely
populist interpretation of popular sovereignty"" does not advance his cause.
By his own testimony, commentary on Madison's argument is "widely diverg-
ing in perspective. '""4 Madison was there concerned with protecting the minor-
ity's superior "faculties of acquiring property" from an "overbearing major-
ity," i.e. the rich from the poor."' To this end he sought to diffuse the ma-
jority's power by spreading the electors over a larger geographical area, count-
ing on different sectional interests to dilute the majority's power. 47 Accord-
ing to Richards, Madison included other values than populism in his inter-
pretation of popular sovereignty, one of which was "equal liberty of religious
conscience," which "restrain the untrammeled pursuit of the popular will.""
But that value was placed beyond the reach of the populace by the first amend-
ment, an exception to the reserved rights of the people. Nor do "federalism,
separation of powers, judicial supremacy" read against populism." Federalism
was a response to the fierce attachment of the people to their local govern-
ments; the separation of powers was designed to curb delegated powers by
diffusion of powers and checks and balances; and judicial "supremacy" was
no child of the Framers.50 When Madison addresses the issue of sovereignty
he reads against Richards. He sought to have the Constitution ratified not
by the state legislatures, but "by the supreme authority of the people
themselves."'" Toward the end of the Convention he said, "[t]he people were
in fact, the fountain of all power . . . . They could alter Constitutions as
they pleased." ' 52 That power of alteration alone undermines a claim for "ab-
solute" authority on behalf of any delegate of the people.
Richards next argues that it is difficult to determine who is the sovereign.
"If understood as the historical persons who approved the original Constitu-
tion, why should they bind a later generation removed in time?" 5 3 The short
on the face of the globe." They did not halt for the discovery of "precedents." THE FEDERALIST
No. 14, at 85 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
44. Richards, supra note 4, at 1385.
45. Id. at n.57.
46. Tim FEDERAmST No. 14, at 54-56 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
47. Id. at 59-61.
48. Richards, supra note 4, at 1385.
49. Id.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 266-72.
51. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 123 (1911).
52. 2 M. FAMtRND, supra note 51, at 476.
53. Richards, supra note 4, at 1384; why "should a contemporary generation be bound in
this way to the will of a generation long dead?" Id. at 1385. Mark Tushnet acknowledges that
the interpretivist view-"we are indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of the past
than being subjected to the whims of willful judges trying to make the Constitution live"-is
"fairly powerful." Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 787 (1983). For an extended discussion of why the
Constitution continues to be authoritative, see Berger, supra note 39, at 188-90 nn.120-35.
Gary Leedes notes public demand that the courts' decisions be based on principles "genuinely
attributable to the Constitution;" "the problem with judge-made law is the fear (and sometimes
the reality) of unfettered discretion, which enables courts to impose unacceptable values on the
19841
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answer is that they don't. Article V enables this generation to remove the
constitutional bonds. The "real issue," to which Richards turns a blind eye,
was underscored by Willard Hurst thirty.years ago: "[Wiho [is to] make the
policy choices in the twentieth century: judges or the combination of legislature
and electorate that makes constitutional amendments." ' 54 Richards is welcome
to prefer "the whims of willful judges," 51 but I challenge him to produce
a single expression by the people, in convention, constitutional text, historical
records or referenda, where they have preferred those "whims" to their writ-
ten Constitution. 6 The people, Hans Linde observed, prefer the Constitution
to the Justices.17
Next Richards said if the sovereign is "understood as some current genera-
tion, how do we know who they are or What they approve when most of
them do not understand, let alone reflectively approve constitutional
institutions." 5 8 This reveals his thinly veiled contempt for democratic govern-
ment. Because the current generation is uninformed he would turn its destiny
over to judges who, of course, are to enforce his aspirations. The philosopher,
Sidney Hook, denounces those "who know what the basic human needs should
be, who know not only what these needs are but what they require better
than those who have them or should have them." 5' As to "who they are
and what they approve," that can be ascertained by submitting the issue to
the people by referenda, amendment or convention whereby they will tell "what
they approve." "Who they are" is the majority who express their preference,
or their legislative representatives who either have spoken-or declined to act.
The rule of the majority, however uncongenial to Richards, was, as Gordon
Wood notes, "the consuming majoritarian character of Revolutionary
thought." 6"
people." Leedes, A Critique of Illegitimate Noninterpretivism, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 533, 540,
563 (1983).
54. Hurst, Discussion, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 75 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) (em-
phasis added).
55. Tushnet, supra note 53. See infra text accompanying notes 266-76.
56. See Leedes, supra note 53, Chief Justice Marshall considered the Constitution to be "a
solemn act of the people themselves . . . made to be preserved, and no organ of government
may alter its terms." E. CORWIN, supra note 39, at 110.
57. The "whole enterprise of constitutional law rests, after all, on the premise that the na-
tion cares about its Constitution, not about its courts." Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 256 (1972).
58. Richards, supra note 4, at 1384.
59. S. HOOK, PHILOSPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1980). "It is arrogant," he adds, to assume
that "some self-selected elites can better determine what the best interests of other citizens are
than those citizens themselves." Id. at 29. Were that true, Noel Annan, Vice Chancellor of the
University of London, stated, "then surely the state is justified in ignoring what ordinary people
say they desire or detest." ISAIAH BERLIN, PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS XVii (1981).
60. G. WOOD, supra note 30, at 64 n.40. "Within the States," said Gouverneur Morris, "a ma-jority must rule, whatever the mischief done among themselves." 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 439 (1937). Majority rule was built into the Constitution. Charles
Pinckney had proposed "making a majority of the Houses, when constituted, capable of deciding
in all, except a few cases, where a larger number may be thought necessary." 3 M. FARRAND,
supra, at 106, 110. The latter exception found expression in several provisions for a two-thirds
[Vol. 59:339
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In place of the "disfiguring . . . fictionalized sovereign," Richards pro-
poses as the "ultimate value of popular sovereignty" an "idealized moral
conception of persons as free, rational and equal."' 6 In his dream world he
posits that such persons "would be concerned with limiting ... severe criminal
sanctions. '" '62 In the real world, however, the people are not at all concerned
with limiting "severe criminal sanctions," but insist rather on capital
punishment. 63 Nor does he view the commonality in the real world as "ra-
tional," but as swayed by "fear and ignorance. '"6' Nevertheless he dreams
of a system "in which the equality and liberty of persons are guaranteed and
maintained, ' 65 and later transmutes it into "a principle of equal liberty. '"66
I would not deprive him of his dreams, but caution him against identifying
them with constitutional law." 67
Certainly his yearning for "equality" was not shared either by the Founders
or by the Framers of the fourteenth amendment. To begin with, in 1776 "in-
dividual rights, even the basic civil liberties that we consider so crucial,
possessed little of their modern theoretical relevance when set against the will
of the people." '68The Founders were more concerned with the rights of the
states, of the collective society than those of individuals. It was conceivable,
Wood observes, "to protect the common law liberties of the people against
their rulers, but hardly against ... themselves." 6 9 When the Founders came
to spell out individual rights in the Bill of Rights, the list was meager indeed:
four amendments are concerned with criminal proceedings, the others safeguard
free speech, religious freedom, the right to bear arms, and quartering of soldiers
in private houses."
Equality of condition as distinguished from equality of opportunity, Madison
came to believe, "was a chimera." 7' Because "the Federalists were fearful
vote: impeachment art. I, § 3, cl. 6; veto override, art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Senate consent to treaties,
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. By implication a majority would suffice in all other instances. Express provi-
sion for a majority was made for the election of a President, art. II, § 3, and for a quorum,
art. I, § 5, cl. 1. See also infra note 80.
61. Richards, supra note 4, at 1385-86.
62. Id. at 1395.
63. "Capital punishment is very popular all over the country." Sherrill, Death Row on Trial,
N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 13, 1983, at 80.
64. Richards, supra note 4, at 1398.
65. Id. at 1386.
66. Id. at 1395.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
68. G. WooD, supra note 30, at 63. As one contemporary wrote in 1776, "the suppression of
minority rights for the sake of the public good was 'a Thing absolutely necessary to be done,'
and 'therefore just in itself.' "Id. at 62. A.T. Mason concluded that "[iun the Convention and
later, states rights and not individual rights-was the real worry." A. MAsoN, Tn STATS RaHTS
DEBATE: ATimEmERALisM AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (1964). Wood remakrs, "[t]his same celebra-
tion of the public welfare and the safety of the people also justified the very severe restrictions
put on private interests and rights throughout the Revolutionary crisis." G. WooD, supra note
30, at 63.
69. G. WooD, supra note 30, at 63.
70. "The original Constitution did very little to protect human rights against the states."
Z. CHAFEE, THREE HlmN Ranrs iN TE CoNsTrrunoN oF 1787 90 (1968).
71. Id. at 411.
1984]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
that republican equality was becoming 'that perfect equality which deadens
the motives of industry' .,. . they were obsessed with the need to insure
that the proper amount of inequality and natural distinction be recognized.""
Madison affirmed that "there will be particularly the distinction of rich and
poor," and cautioned against the "future danger" of a "leveling spirit.""'
"Perfect equality" in men's "possessions" was not for him. Hamilton agreed
that "nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would
exist as long as liberty existed.""4 A people who countenanced slavery could
make only a slight obeisance to equality.
The scene did not materially shift in the Reconstruction era. A leading aboli-
tionist theorist, John Bingham, who was to be the draftsman of the four-
teenth amendment, said in 1859:
Nobody proposes or dreams of political equality any more than of physical
or mental equality. It is as impossible for men to establish equality in
these respects as it is for "the Ethiopian to change his skin.""
In the 39th Congress, he led the movement to admit Tennessee despite the
absence of a provision for Negro suffrage in its Constitution, saying, "we
are all for equal and exact justice ... [but]-justice for all is not to be secured
in a day." 6 Time and again, proposals to bar ALL discriminations were
rejected. 7 Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the radicals who sought equality for
the blacks, concluded that the "amendment falls far short of my wishes"
but "it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public opinion ....
I .. .leave it to be perfected by better men in better times."' 78 Finally, the
chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Senator William
Fessenden, stated, "we cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing
prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class
distinctions." ' 7 9 All of which demonstrates that for the Framers "equal" did
72. Id. at 495. John Adams also believed in the inevitability of such distinctions. Id. at 572.
73. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 51, at 422-23.
74. Id. at 424.
75. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). The "equality" Bingham envisioned "con-
templated that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of
his life." CONG. GLOBE App., 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (1857). A black academician, Derrick
Bell, points out that "few abolitionists were interested in offering blacks the equality they touted
so highly." Bell, Book Review, 76 COLUM. L. REy. 350, 358 (1976).
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3979 (1866).
77. For citations see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 163-64.
78. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv.
1, 45-46 (1955).
79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
80. "One is driven by the evidence," C. Vann Woodward states, to conclude that "popular
convictions were not prepared to sustain" a "guarantee of equality." C. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN
OF SOUTHERN I-l1sToRY 83 (1960). Early in the session, Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri
stated, "a bold declaration of man's equality cannot be carried." CONG. GLOBE App., 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 119 (1866). In light of the foregoing it is not a little remarkable that Robert A. Burt
should posit that "equality is a bedrock substantive principle of democratic theory and, insofar
as the majority is free to disregard the wishes of members of the losing minority and thereby
[Vol. 59:339
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
not mean across-the-board equality."0 Nor does Richards' "idealized" world
correspond to the real world in 1954 when it would have been impossible
to obtain an amendment to outlaw segregation,8' nor with the fact that racism
is on the increase.82 That is a deplorable reflection on American society, but
it does not empower the Court to supply what the people would withhold.
As Stevens stated, the imperfections of the fourteenth amendment are "to
be perfected by better men in better times"-by way of an amendment.
To extract from such "general" clauses the proposition that-they "derived
their force and meaning from a larger political and moral culture which per-
ceived the human rights embodied in these clauses as grounded in inviolable
and enduring principles of justice," 83 is to substitute a dream world for harsh
reality. Justice Bradley, who was close in time to the enactment of the four-
teenth amendment and better appreciated the aims of its Framers, declared
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which "covers the same ground as the Four-
teenth Amendment, ' 8 4 sought to secure
those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely:
the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue . . . to inherit, pur-
chase ... property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.... [C]ongress did
not assume ... to adjust what may be called the social rights of men
... but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights .... '
Richards proves that rhetoric is no substitute for fact.
"CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS" AND DEATH PENALTIES
Before examining Richards' theory of interpretation it will be fruitful to
to treat them as less than equals, majority rule is intrinsically at odds with the egalitarian princi-
ple." Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984). Certainly
neither the Founders nor the 1866 Framers entertained such an "egalitarian principle." G. Ed-
ward White notes that the Constitution "was 'sold' largely on the rhetoric of majoritarianism."
White, Judicial Activism and the Identity of the Legal Profession, 67 JuDIcATURE 246, 250 (1983).
And John Hart Ely observed that "rule in accord with the consent of a majority of the governed
is the core of the American governmental system"; our "constitutional development over the
past century has... substantially strengthened the original control by a majority of the governed."
ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DIsTRUsT 7 (1980).
81. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204,
237 (1980). Edmond Cahn wrote, "as a practical matter it would have been impossible to secure
adoption of a constitutional amendment to abolish 'separate but equal.'" Cahn, Jurisprudence,
30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 156 (1955).
82. In the Fall of 1975, Derrick Bell stated, "[t]oday opposition to desegregation is, if anything,
greater than in 1954." Bell, The Burden of Brown on Black: History Based on Operation of
a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 25, 26 (1975). Chester Finn wrote, the issue of racial
discrimination "has been fanned into the most protracted, rancorous and divisive blaze of the
post-war era." Finn, Book Review, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1976, at 78.
83. Richards, supra note 4, at 1382. Compare the statement of James Wilson, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, "I fear that comprehensive statesmanship which cares for
posterity as well as itself will not leave its impress upon the measure we are now considering."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2947 (1866).
84. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter
House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8, 408).
85. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); see supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
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consider his treatment of a concrete example, the eighth amendment's "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause. The terms first appeared in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689.86 Many crimes continued to be punished by death in
England and the colonies before and after 1789, when our Bill of Rights in-
corporated the terms in the eighth amendment. Not one case had condemned
such penalties prior to 1976. A zealous crusader for the abolition of death
penalties, Hugo Bedau, wrote in 1968 that death penalties
are not unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because however
cruel and unusual they may now be, they are not more "cruel" and not
more "unusual" than were those that prevailed in England and the col-
onies two or three hundred years ago. An unbroken line of interpreters
has held that it was the original understanding and intent of the framers
of the Eighth Amendment... to proscribe as "cruel and unusual" only
such modes of execution as compound the simple infliction of death with
added cruelties . . .7
In 1977 Bedau also wrote, "[u]ntil fifteen years ago, save for a few mavericks,
no one gave any credence to the possibility of ending the death penalty by
judicial interpretation of constitutional law."' 8  "Save for a few eccentrics and
visionaries," he remarked, the death penalty was "taken for granted by all
men . . . as a bulwark of social order." 8 9 To borrow from the Court's 1983
legislative chaplain case, "a practice.., that has continued without interrup-
tion since the earliest session of Congress,"" cannot be deemed a "cruel and
unusual punishment." That First Congress, which drafted the eighth amend-
ment and therefore knew best whether it banned death penalties, enacted the
Act of April, 1790, making murder, robbery and the like punishable by death,
and to safeguard the penalty it prohibited resort to "benefit of clergy" as
an exemption from capital punishment." Incontrovertible evidence that the
Framers did not intend "cruel and unusual punishments" to bar death penalties
is furnished by the face of the Constitution. Sanford Levinson, an opponent
of death penalties, considers it a "devastating fact" that "both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments specifically acknowledge the possibility of a death
penalty. They require only that due process be followed before a person be
deprived of his life." 9 This Richards dismisses because "[i]f the imposition
86. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANNICA 578 (14th ed. 1930).
87. Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201, 229.
88. H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, Tm CONSTm'UnON,. AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 118 (1977).
89. Id. at 12.
90. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3334 (1983). Justice Story remarked in a similar case,
"such acquiescence in it, such contemporary construction of it, and such extensive and uniform
recognition of it ... would ... entitle the question to be considered at rest." Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842).
91. Ch. 9, 1 Stat. 115, 139. "This court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a con-
temporary legislative exposition of the Constitution when the Founders of our Government and
framers of the Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes
the construction to be given its provisions." Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
412 (1928).
92. Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NATION, Feb. 26, 1983, at 248, 249.
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of a death penalty cannot satisfy the demanding requirements of the eighth
amendment, a fortiori it can no longer be regarded as consistent with due
process." '9 3 Patently the Founders saw no inconsistency when they provided
that death penalties were inflictable after a fair trial, the sole requirement
of due process.
The undeniable evidence that both in 1789 and in 1866 due process was
purely procedural is kissed off by Richards as what "[Berger] supposes to be
the clear language of the fifth amendment." 4 Like the Four Horsemen,
Richards transforms procedural due process in the courts into a test of legisla-
tion, the substantive due process the Court has disavowed.9 He asserts that
"fundamental principles of due process of law require that both courts and
legislatures pursue constitutionally reasonable purposes in rationally reasonable
ways." 96 That assertion runs counter to Hamilton's summary of 400 years
of law on the eve of the Convention:
The words "due process" have a precise technical import, and are only
applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they
can never be referred to an act of the legislature.97
In the fourteenth amendment, said the Supreme Court, the words were
"used in the same sense and to no greater extent" than in the fifth
amendment." But for a few "aberrational cases the prevalent judicial usage
was procedural." 99 When asked what he meant by due process, the drafts-
man of the fourteenth, John Bingham, replied, "the courts have settled that
long ago, and the gentlemen can go and read their decisions.'' ° ° William
Lawrence, the legal scholar of the 39th Congress, quoted the Hamilton defini-
tion in 1871; 10 and his fellow framer, James Garfield, stated in 1871 that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment "is copied from" the
fifth, differing in that it applied to the states. He defined it as "an impartial
93. Richards, supra note 4, at 1390 n.73.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
96. Richards, supra note 4, at 1379 (emphasis added).
97. IV TiE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAmLTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962); Berger,
"Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 1 (1979). Charles G. Haines wrote that
in England due process of law referred to "a method of procedure in criminal trials." When
it was inserted in American state constitutions, "it was accepted with the usual English significance"
and "not regarded as a check on legislative authority." C. HAINES, THE AMERIcAN DOCTRINE
OF LEaisILATrvE SUPREmACY 410 (2d ed. rev. 1959).
98. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). Charles Curtis, an admirer of judicial
adaptation of the Constitution, said that when the Framers put due process "into the Fifth Amend-
ment, its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law would make a phrase....
It meant a procedural due process." Curtis, Review and Majority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND
SUPREm LAW 170, 177 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).
99. Ely, Constitutional Interpetivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 417-20
(1978). See also Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HAljv.
L. REv. 366, 474-75 (1911); R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 201, 208.
100. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
101. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1245 (1871).
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trial according to the laws of the land." 1 Nowhere in the Reconstruction
debates did I encounter a contrary definition; 103 instead the debaters treated
due process as procedural.
Richards also argues that "[i]f 'bill of attainder' is not specific enough to
confine interpretation, it is hard to see how . . . 'cruel and unusual
punishments' could possibly be."'' 0 "Bills of Attainder" were words that,
Justice Frankfurter wrote, "were defined by history. Their meaning was so
settled by history that definition was superfluous."' 5 A bill of attainder was
a legislative decree of death; without death there was no attainder.0 6 Lesser
legislative punishments were known as "bills of pains and penalties"; the line
between the two was firmly drawn at common law.0 7 True, that line has been
obliterated by the Court, but we may not justify a fresh judicial usurpation
by appeal to a prior arrogation. Our task, as the Founders counselled, is to
hark back to first principles.'
Richards urges us to focus "on the more abstract intentions" that the "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause expresses "namely, . . . prohibitions on un-
necessary harshness in criminal sanctions" ' 9-ignoring the undeniable fact
that the infliction of death penalties in England and America for 300 years
evidenced a judgment that they are not unnecessarily harsh. The Court's
repeatedly applied canon that a construction by the First Congress buttressed
by long acquiescence fixes the meaning of the clause" is of no moment for
Richards. Instead he extracts the inference that its meaning "should not be
bound to Founders' applications, but should be construed as embodying
abstract principles of justice."" By "applications" Richards presumably refers
to the specific purposes the Framers had in mind: "An Absorption in Founders
application may also radically misrepresent the kind of value and institution
102. CONG. GLOBE App., 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1871).
103. Ely also remarks that the debates are "devoid of any reference that gives the provision
more than a procedural connotation." J. ELY, supra note 20, at 15.
104. Richards, supra note 4, at 1381.
105. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. For citations see Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63
CORNELL L.REv. 355, 356-57, 373-78 (1978). The Court itself has acknowledged the undeniable;
see Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473 & n.35 (1977); United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 317 n.6 (1946).
107. Justice Frankfurter observed, "It]he punishment imposed by the most dreaded bill of at-
tainder was of course death; lesser punishments were-imposed by similar bills more technically
called bills of pains and penalties." Lovett, 328 U.S. at 323-24.
108. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared that "[a] frequent recurrence to the
fundamental principles of the constitution ... [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages
of liberty and to maintain a free government. . . .The people . . . have a right to require of
their law givers and magistrates an exact and constant observance of them .... " PART THE
FIRST, ARTICLE XVIII, 1 BEN PooRE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS
959 (1877). For citations to similar provisions in other early state constitutions see Berger, supra
note 1, at 287 n.18.
109. Richards, supra note 4, at 1380.
110. See supra notes 90-91.
111. Richards, supra note 4, at 1380.
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they were contemplating. The point becomes obvious, as Berger concedes,
,when technological changes produce situations that the framers could not have
contemplated, e.g., electronic surveillance.'"" 2 Apparently Richards is unable
to grasp the distinction between application of a principle to analogous facts
and reversal of the principle. For example, the Draftsmen of the "search and
seizure" provision purposed to guarantee the right of the people to be secure
in their houses and persons. Today planting an electronic eavesdropping device
comes within this central purpose: "[S]ecurity of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police."' ' 3 That security can be invaded by a break-in to
conduct a search or by planting an electronic device to eavesdrop, just as
commerce remains "commerce" whether transportation be by oxcart or by
airplane. "' The case is quite different, however, when the Draftsmen rejected
a given "application," for instance, refused to ban all discriminations by the
fourteenth amendment."' To justify an expansion of the goals they refused
to embrace is not merely to reach out to an unforeseen "application" but
to reverse the Framers' determination, as when the Court replaced the Framers'
incontestable exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment with the
"one man-one vote" principle."' This was repudiation, not "application"
of the prior principle denying blacks the vote." 7 And that unjust denial severely
limited the Framers' embodiment of "abstract principles of justice."
For support of such transmutations Richards relies on "the language used
[which is confined by the unvarying 300 year interpretation], historical con-
text [cruel and unusual punishments and death penalties lived side by side
for 300 years], the tradition of judicial elaboration [prior to 1976 no court
had questioned the constitutionality of death penalties]."' To buttress the
112. Id. at 1387. "While the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet new and difficult conditions .... " Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
113. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
114. As John Hart Ely observed, the Constitution may be applied to new situations involving
"the sorts of evils the framers meant to combat and ... their twentieth century counterparts."
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929 (1973).
115. R. BEROER, supra note 1, at 163-64.
116. Supra note 15. Robert Bork observed, "the principle of one man, one vote . . . runs
counter to the text of the fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratifica-
tion and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented
the new formula." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 18 (1971). Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree that the "one person-one
vote lacks all historical justification." Gunther, Too Much A Battle With Strawmen, Wall St.
J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
117. Throughout Richards fails to consider whether overturn of the governing principle, e.g.,
exclusion of suffrage, was an "application" of that principle. Instead he goes on to say that
"[d]iscretionary capital punishment.., is a wholly different institution ... than the mandatory
capital punishment contemplated by the Founders." Richards, supra note 4, at 1388. But "discre-
tionary capital punishment" was ever a jury prerogative, as when it refused to find the accused
guilty under its discretion to convict or not. R. BERoE, DEATH PENALTLEs: THE SuppamE COURT'S
OBSTACLE COURSE 133-38 (1982). Over the years juries reacted unfavorably to the harshness of
mandatory death sentences, and finally legislatures granted juries the discretion which they had
been exercising in fact. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971).
118. Richards, supra note 4, at 1380.
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"abstract" language of the clause, he argues that it does not use "expres-
sions that would confine meaning to some class of historic objects" such as
"could perhaps be plausibly made regarding an 'impartial jury' on the basis
of the languge used, the relatively high degree of specificity that the concept
of an impartial jury had acquired at the time of Founders, and the relatively
low degree of generalization that the subject matter of the phrase permits."" 9
One who has witnessed the countless variety of challenges to the impartiality
of prospective jurors will not conclude that "impartial jury" has a "higher
degree of specificity" than the bald, single fact that for 300 years murder
punishable by death was not a cruel and unusual punishment.
Repeatedly Richards charges me with "grave" "historical distortion in the
use of sources," omission of the "source" of a "larger historical inquiry,"
and inability "to deal with historical evidence in a dispassionate way."' 20 His,
for instance, is an unfavorable comparison with John McManners' "broad
survey of changing attitudes to death in various contexts . . in eighteenth
century France," which "demonstrates the emergence of a distinctive modem
sensibility regarding death and dying," expressed in "reformist skepticism
about the . . . use of the death penalty . . . . This skepticism is likely to
have affected the American Enlightenment and constitutionalism through the
writings of Beccaria.... Though these arguments did not lead them to ques-
tion penalties as such, the arguments did suggest real moral concerns with
the death penalty."' 2 ' How little such "moral concerns" moved the Founders
is disclosed by the First Congress' imposition of death penalties by the Act
of 1790. This Richards labels as "Berger's narrow focus on the simple fact
that the death penalty was approved."' 2 2 Presumably such facts led Richards
to say, "Berger's use of history is extremely confined and narrow."' 23 If
Richards is to qualify as an expert on constitutional construction, I suggest
he would be well advised to exclude considerations that confessedly did not
influence the Draftsmen and "narrowly" to focus on what they said and did.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1390 & n.73. One who makes such charges should be beyond reproach. Consider
his statement that Berger "claims that the judicial divinations are often wrong, that the proper
institution to render changes in moral values is the legislature .... " Id. at 1394 (emphasis
added). Unlike Richards, I eschew bare assertion. Instead I cited then-Solicitor General Robert
H. Jackson: "time has proved that [the Court's] judgment was wrong in most of the outstanding
issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular branches." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY X, 37 (1941). For citations to academicians see BERGER, supra note
1, at 331 n.66. John Hart Ely wrote that "the theory that the legislature does not truly speak
for the people's values, but the Court does, is ludicrous." J. ELY, supra note 20, at 68. A
distinterested, fair-minded scholar would not lead his readers to believe that Berger is without
support.
For his historical materials Richards cites to "Brief for Petitioner" in a murder appeal, Richards,
supra note 4, at 1394 n.96, blissfully unaware that "lawyers history" is heavily discounted. Tushnet,
supra note 53, at 793; Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV.
119, 155-56.
121. Richards, supra note 4, at 1390-91 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 1389.
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He prefers to reason, however, that the "extensive use of the death penalty
during the eighteenth century was tolerated because death was so common."
Now that "life becomes more securely valued [the victim's too] ... the death
penalty should be morally more questionable."' 24 Again, "theological con-
ceptions of Hell . . . undoubtedly shaped conceptions of justice in punish-
ment .... In the modern secular age ... conceptions of retributive justice
in punishment, which require the death penalty, appear parochially
religious."' 2 5 Accordingly, he concludes that "such shifts in religious,
metaphysical and other beliefs" indicate that "the Founders' denotations
should not apply counterfactually."I26 But the overwhelming fact is that the
people, like the Founders, cling to death penalties, as Richards acknowledges
in deprecating "populist retributivism, compounded of fear and ignorance."' 27
Yet Richards accuses me of "ignor[ing] the ways in the moral growth of the
community must inevitably shape construction of the eighth amendment,"' 28
when in truth he seeks a judicial "transformation of American conventional
morality in the ethically required way that [his newly concocted] constitutional
principle demands. ' 129
"A striking example" of Berger's alleged "tendentiousness" is his
dismissal of what seems to be clear and relevant evidence that the language
of "cruel and unusual punishments" was understood by the Founders
possibly to someday invalidate punishments conventionally supposed
legitimate in 1791, namely Livermore's objection: "it is sometimes necessary
to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their
ears cut off, but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these
punishments because they are cruel?"''
From this solitary statement by an opponent of the clause' 3 ' Richards ex-
tracts the understanding of the Founders. But they were unmoved by Liver-
more's fears that the clause would prevent hanging for by the Act of 1790
they provided death penalties. Nor could Livermore's statement overcome the
Framers' endorsement of death penalties embodied in the fifth amendment.
Then too, they chose terms of settled meaning that could not be curtailed
by Livermore's solitary utterance. Doubtless the Framers were aware of the
long-settled rule of construction expressed in Bacon's Abridgment: "If a statute
makes use of a word the meaning of which is well known at common law,
124. Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 1392-93.
126. Id. at 1393 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1398.
128. Id. at 1388-89 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1398.
130. Id. at 1390 n.73.
131. Remarks "made in the course of the legislative debates or hearings other than by persons
responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a bill are entitled to little weight .... This
is especially so with regard to statements of legislative opponents who 'in their zeal to defeat
a bill understandably tend to overstate its reach.' " Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
204 n.24 (1976). "An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority."
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Bd., 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956).
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the word shall be understood in the same sense it was understood at the Com-
mon Law."' 3 2 Chief Justice Marshall applied the rule in Gibbons v. Ogden,
stating that if a word was understood in a certain sense "when the Constitu-
tion was framed . . .the Convention must have used it in that sense," a
presumption "which is to be given judicial effect.' ' 33 When the Framers
employed common law terms the common law "definitions," Justice Story
stated, "are necessarily included as much as if they stood in the text of the
Constitution."' 34 In sum, Marshall's presumption and the measures the
Framers adopted after Livermore's objection override it. My reliance on such
time-honored canons and the rule that the Framers? intention rather than the
text is the law, marks me, according to Richards, as "a partisan advocate
of a theory of legal interpretation which is ... almost certainly indefensible.""'
A third example of my inadequacy is that I "miss the point" of the Titus
Oates case, its "true significance" being that since the "imposition of the
death penalty in modern times is ineradicably used as an instrument of freakish
terror against subjugated groups to enforce a status hierarchy [this is 'dispas-
sionate"?], it must be condemned on egalitarian grounds."' 36 Richards' reading
of Oates is condemned out of his own mouth:
Titus Oates was a minister of the Church of England [and therefore not
a member of "subjugated groups"] whose prejured testimony about a
Catholic plot to assassinate the king led to the execution of 15 Catholics
for treason. In 1685, Oates was convicted of perjury and sentenced to
a fine, life imprisonment, whipping, pillorying four times a year, and
defrocking. The House of Lords rejected Oates' petition to be released
from the judgment; the dissenting members emphasized that defrocking
by a temporal court was "unusual" because it was the function of an
ecclesiastical court, and that punishments of life imprisonment and whip-
ping were without precedent for the crime of perjury."'
What is "egalitarian" about arguing lack of secular jurisdiction and of
132. 4 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, "Statute" (1), (4) (3d
ed. 1768).
133. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 90 (1824); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("the
words 'trial by jury' were placed in the Constitution ... with reference to the meaning affixed
to them in the law as it was in this country and England at the adoption of that instrument.").
134. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820).
135. Richards, supra note 4, at 1390 n.73. Richards himself recognizes that "people make wills
and contracts . . .and we interpret their action, in part, in terms of the legal principles that
their conduct reflects or flouts." Id. at 1376. One such rule is to effectuate the intention of
the draftsmen, see supra note 14, which the Court has "uninterruptedly" applied to interpretation
of the Constitution. tenBroek, Use by the Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constituional
Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAIF. L. REv. 399 (1939).
Another rule is to give effect to a contemporaneous construction long respected. See supra notes
90-91. A third rule is the presumption that common law terms are to have their common law
meaning, see supra text accompanying notes 132-34. As Richards acknowledges, "the social conven-
tions called law are embodied in . . .a written Constitution whose major terms are generally
known." Richards, supra note 4, at 1377.
136. Richards, supra note 4, at 1392.
137. Id. at n.85.
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precedent-perjury was not even a statutory crime at the time.' 38 With the
dissent before them [Richards prefers dissents] the Lords held in effect that
whipping, pillorying, etc. were not within the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause.
In truth, Richards' insistence that death penalties are banned by the "cruel
and unusual punishments" clause merely cloaks his own personal opposition
to such penalties. He is unhappy with the Court's refusal to accept the
dissenters' view: "The deep question is whether the Court has gone far enough,
whether Justices Marshall and Brennan are not correct in questioning the very
constitutional permissibility of the death penalty."' 139 Their view "expresses
the demand that populist retributivism-itself compounded of fear and ig-
norance and much stereotypical contempt-constrain itself by constitutional
demand that criminals, even vicious ones, are to be treated as persons."' °
Thus Richards confesses that the people as well as the Court are not with
him; and he calls upon the Court for "a transformation of American conven-
tional morality."' There is no need here to repeat my demonstration that
the Brennan-Marshall dissents are the veriest wishful thinking.'4 2
Richards' "constitutional demand" is based on "the central place" that
dignity "enjoys in the jurisprudence of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments."'' 4 3 Bare assertion cannot take the place of proof. The earliest
reference by the Court to "the dignity of man" that I found occurs in Trop
v. Dulles44 where the issue was whether an American guilty of wartime deser-
tion could be deprived of his citizenship. Wartime desertion was from 1776
138. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIts: THE SuPRE E CoURT's OBSTACLE COURSE 37-38 (1982).
Richards builds heavily on Oates, referring to "the concerns giving rise to the eighth amendment
(Titus Oates)." Richards, supra note 4, at 1397. Now the 1689 Bill of Rights preceded the debates
on the Oates case, BERGER, supra, at 39; and if the Founders referred to Oates in their 1789
debates, it escaped my attention. Again, Richards is betrayed by his off-the-cuff style; invoking
Oates a third time for "abstract intentions implicit in the salient history of the relevant clauses
(for example, the Titus Oates affair." Richards, supra, at 1395. Presumably he finds in Oates
an "abstract intention" to outlaw death penalties, a subject totally unrelated to the case-a truly
"freakish" reading. Anthony Granucci, who first looked to the Oates case for light on the meaning
of "cruel and unusual," concluded that "in the context of the Oates case 'cruel and unusual'
seems to have meant mere punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction
of the court to impose." Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted, 57 CALI.
L. Rnv. 839, 859 (1969).
139. Richards, supra note 4, at 1394.
140. Id. at 1398 (emphasis added). "There seems to be an instinctive feeling in most ordinary
men that a person who has done an injury to others should be punished for it .... [Wlithout
a sense of retribution we may lose our sense of wrong." A.L. GOODHART, ENGLSH LAW AND
THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953). Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens, the plurality in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) stated, "[iln part, capital punishment is an expression of society's
moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many,
but it is essential to an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather
than self-help to vindicate their wrongs."
141. Richards, supra note 4, at 1398.
142. R. BEROER, supra note 138, at 30, 47 n.86, 119, 126, 130 n.74 & 132-34.
143. Richards, supra note 4, at 1398.
144. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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on punishable by death,"4 5 and forfeiture of citizenship is not a greater af-
front to "dignity" than the death penalty. But Chief Justice Warren, never
hobbled by the demands of logic, expressly accepted the death penalty because
it "had been employed throughout our history" and was still "widely
accepted."' 4 He concluded, however, that "the basic concept underlying the
eighth amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man,"'" 7 drawing on
his imagination not jurisprudence, and held that the forfeiture penalty violated
that dignity and was invalid. But Blackstone had written that some punishments
"fix a lasting stigma on the offender, by slitting his nostrils or branding .
• .," other punishments "consist principally in their ignominy . . . such as
whipping ... the pillory."'4 8 Lord Camden referred to "loss of ears, whipp-
ing or any other disgrace.""' So disgrace and ignominy, not respect for dignity,
were prime ingredients of punishment and widely used in the colonies.
To discredit the "original understanding," Richards argues that it "would
require the Court today to uphold all punishments acceptable in 1791, in-
cluding presumably, branding the forehead, splitting noses and cropping
ears.""'  Were the people to demand such punishments from their represen-
tatives the Constitution would interpose no obstacle. The Court is not author-
ized to exclude from the Constitution what offends its morals, still less those
of Richards."' Richards yearns to be the moral censor of the people whereas
I believe with Justice Holmes that they have the right to govern themselves
even when their ways are not mine.I" When, therefore, Justices Stewart, Powell
and Stevens concluded in Gregg v. Georgia that the eighth amendment demands
not only that "a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary
society," but also that it "comports with the basic concept of human dignity
at the core of the amendment," ' they spoke without historical basis and
were contradicted by the degrading punishments-pillorying, whipping,
ducking-that were extant in the colonies at the adoption of the Constitution."'
Even Justice Field, though revolted by such punishments, acknowledged that
they were constitutional.' 5 They were not abandoned at the behest of the
145. Id. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Burton, Clark and Harlan JJ.).
146. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99.
147. Id. at 100. Richards summarily dismisses "allegiance to Founders' denotations ... as
a shallow and empty constitutional ideal," a canon to which the Court has subscribed for almost
200 years! Instead he prizes "dignity [as] a value that endures,". i.e., an undoubted murderer
"should be treated as a person, not as criminal outcasts beyond the pale of human concerns."
Richards, supra note 4, at 1398. For a powerful critique of such thinking see van den Haag,
For the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at A-21.
148. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARs ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 377 (1765-1769).
149. Quoted in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 136 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
150. Richards, supra note 4, at 1394.
151. The "Court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of
policy or morals." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1980) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. Holmes said to John W. Davis, "if my country wants to go to hell, I am here to help
it." F. BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 9 (1961).
153. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
154. For citations see R. BERGER, supra note 138, at 118 n.29.
155. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892).
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courts but by legislatures in response to public sentiment. 56 The Justices drew
their "basic concept" from "the evolving standards that mark the progress
of a maturing society," that is, "cruel and unusual punishments" may "ac-
quire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice." 5 '
But public adherence to death penalties demonstrated that that day had not
yet arrived.'"' Moreover, the Justices engaged in circular reasoning: the desires
of "contemporary society" must yield to a "basic concept" that is drawn
from "public opinion."
Richards also locates "respect for human dignity" in the fourteenth amend-
ment, in "the larger historical and cultural contexts that clarify the abstract
ideals of equal respect for human dignity which the fourteenth amendment
decisively introduces into the substantive values of American constitutional
law," and which I allegedly "ignore."' 59 So far as "constitutional law" is
grounded in the Constitution and its history, I could not "ignore" what it
does not contain. Unlike Richards, I daresay, I read every page of the 1866
debates more than once and did not find that the Framers were-moved by
the "larger historical and cultural contexts" to proceed from "respect for
human dignity." To the contrary, refusal of the ballot, the quintessential
right,'60 preservation of segregation, repeated rejection of a ban on all
discrimination, all underscore the limited purpose of the Framers-to thwart
the South's attempt to return the emancipated blacks to serfdom' 6' and to
assure them the right to "exist" by providing for no discrimination in the
making of contracts, the owning of property and access to the courts for the
protection of those rights.' 62 It was not until 1875 that Congress attempted
to supply equal access to inns and transportation, not to schools,'6 3 an effort
aborted by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases.'64
156. Chief Justice Burger in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972).
157. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171, 173 (1976).
158. Richards asserts that capital punishment is so lacking in "marginal deterrence," that
it "violates basic constitutional principles." Richards, supra note 4, at 1396. What "basic con-
stitutional principles" does it violate? No constitutional principle that capital punishment must
act as a deterrent came across my ken. The people, as 300 years of history confirms, were left
free to impose death penalties; if they chose to act out of "populist retributivism" they were
not required to find that deaih acted as a "deterrent."
159. Richards, supra note 4, at 1389 (emphasis added). Richards is not given to understatement.
160. Senator Charles Sumner considered the right to vote "the Great Guarantee; and the only
sufficient Guarantee." CoNG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 685 (1866). He continued to insist
on suffrage because "if the Fourteenth Amendment is inadequate to protect persons in their
... right to vote, it is inadequate to protect them in anything." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
161. For citations see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 25-26; Berger, Paul Diamond Fails to Meet
Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 43 OGio ST. L.J. 285, 295-96 (1982).
162. William Lawrence stated, "[ilt is idle to say that a citizen shall have a right to life, yet
to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone he can live" and to "deny him the right to make
a contract to secure the privileges and rewards of labor." CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
1833 (1866). See also Justice Bradley, supra text accompanying note 85.
163. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment; Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 311,
329-31 (1979).
164. 109 U.S. 3 (1882).
19841
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Richards should really leave off bare assertion and supply the facts that
prove the Framers "decisively introduced" a principle of "equal respect for
human dignity," that "dignity has the central place that it enjoys in the
jurisprudence of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.""' What
"jurisprudence" prior to the Court's reversal of the long course of history
and adjudication in the 1970s? For one not deeply committed to abolition
of death penalties it is not easy to perceive wherein one who murders another
"person" is deprived of "dignity" by being subject to a like loss of life. 1"
Poor deluded people. Like Robespierre, Richards would maintain that if they
"would not be free and virtuous voluntarily, then he would force them to
be free and cram virtue down their throats."' 67 But thinkers of greater stature
rebuff efforts of a self-appointed elite to determine what is best for the
people. 16'
Richards charges, "[c]ertainly no argument in [Berger's] Death Penalties even
addresses the arguments of principle made in Supreme Court decisions limiting
the scope and application of the death penalty." 6 9 The reader need only con-
sult the forty pages of painstaking analysis I devote to the decisions to find
the charge false.'" For example, Justice Powell's citation of a fledgling lawyer
for the proposition that "It]he principle of disproportionality is deeply rooted
in English constitutional law," is refuted by my analysis of the sources.""
Considering that as late as 1813 Lord Ellenborough objected to repeal of the
death penalty for the theft of a few shillings,' Powell's "deeply rooted"
disproportionality verges on travesty. As usual Richards does not pause to
examine my detailed documentation but parrots "a principle of proportionality
with two requirements: first, a rough correspondence between severity of
wrongs and gradations among punishments; and second, substantive upper
limits on forms of sanction in general (prohibiting torture as inconsistent with
respect for dignity) and in particular (prohibiting severe sanctions for trivial
wrongs)." 73 Hanging for theft of a few shillings refutes correspondence bet-
165. Richards, supra note 4, at 1398. Another example of verbal sleight-of-hand is Richards'
statement, "[s]uch judgments are neither elitist nor antidemocratic, for they express no disrespect
or contempt for human dignity or equality." Id. The test of "democratic" is to give effect to
what the people desire, not to what an "elite" of illuminati consider they ought to desire. See
supra note 59.
166. Florida's death row, Robert Sherrill reports, "is populated with scores of fellows who,
if anyone deserves to die, certainly seem to: mass murderers, murderers who kill habitually,
who killed for fun, who killed for hire, murderers who raped and tortured women, who raped
and tortured children." Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 13, 1983, at 80.
167. C. BRINTON, J. CHRISTOPHER & R. WOLFF, A HIsToRy OF CVmIZATION 115 (1955). From
"their experience under the Protectorate, Englishmen learned... [that] the claims of self-appointed
saints to know by divine inspiration what the good life should be and to have the right to impose
their notions on the ungodly could be as great a threat as the divine right of kings." S. SmrrH,
SELECTED WRITINGS xvi (W.H. Auden ed. 1956).
168. See supra notes 59, 167.
169. Richards, supra note 4, at 1394.
170. R. BERGER, supra note 138, at 112-52.
171. Id. at 35, 40-41.
172. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 246 n.9 (1972).
173. Richards, supra note 4, at 1395.
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ween the "severity of wrongs and gradation among punishments." Torture
was not abandoned so much because of concern for the murderer's "digni-
ty"-being carted through the London streets to Newgate and publicly hang-
ed was a denial of "dignity"-as by a retreat from needless cruelty. A bar
to "torture" requires no new principle; that was banned by the "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause.
To bolster his historiographical disquisition, Richards appeals to an historian,
Harold Hyman, "not bound by an interpretive theory like Berger," but who
"supplements attention to the debates with detailed and clarifying analyses
of the political and social history of the Reconstruction."' 74 Hyman in no
wise questions my central conclusion that the Framers excluded Negro suf-
frage from the fourteenth amendment. Instead he stated that
[n]egrophobia tended to hold even the sparse Reconstruction institutions
that the nations created at low throttle, and played a part in Reconstruc-
tion's incompleteness. "
Whatever the tenor of his "social history," it cannot diminish the force of
unequivocal statements in Congress by those who enacted the legislation. It
is those statements that are regarded as expressing the intention of the
Draftsmen, 76 and if Hyman is to the contrary, he would overturn a long-
established canon of construction.
In an "unpublished manuscript," Richards tells us, Hyman "insists that
the fourteenth amendment must be understood in the context of the egalitarian
purposes of the thirteenth amendment and the larger moral aspirations of
the abolitionist movement." 177 Unquestionably some appealed to the thirteenth
amendment for constitutional authority to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which banned discrimination respecting the right to contract, own property
and access to the courts. But there was vigorous opposition, and the four-
teenth amendment was adopted to supply what the majority considered the
thirteenth did not.178 So, Roscoe Conkling declared that "[e]mancipation vital-
174. 1d. at 1389.
175. H. HYmN, A MoRE PmuEcCT UmON 447 (1973); see also id. at 470. A fellow Reconstruction
historian, Alfred Kelly, wrote that the "commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant
that the radical Negro reform program could be only a very limited one." Kelly, Comment on
Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in N-w FRoNTIERs OF THE AmEucAN RECONsRUcTION 55 (H. Hyman
ed. 1966). Without the help of Hyman's "clarifying analysis" Justice Bradley came to a similar
conclusion. See supra text accompanying note 85.
176. "It has never been questioned in this Court that Committee reports, as well as statements
by those in charge of a bill, are authoritative elucidations of the scope of a measure." Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It
is a strange theory of interpretation that would give utterances outside the halls of Congress
more weight than those of proponents on the floor. See supra note 131.
177. Richards, supra note 4, at 1389.
178. The draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, John Bingham, insisted that the lack should
be remedied "not by an arbitrary assumption of power, but by amending the Constitution
... expressly prohibiting the States from any abuse of power in the future." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st sess. 291 (1866). United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882) rejected the
notion that "under a provision of the Constitution which simply abolished slavery and involun-
tary servitude, we should, with few exceptions, invest Congress with power over the whole catalog
of crimes ... [b]y which the right of any person to life, property or reputation is invaded."
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izes only natural rights, not political rights."' 79 And most Republicans held that
natural rights did not include the right to vote. Senator Henry Wilson, a
Massachusetts Radical, said that the thirteenth amendment "was never
understood by any man in the Senate or House to confer upon Congress the
right to proscribe or regulate suffrage . .,. . If it had been supposed that
it gave that power the amendment would never have passed Congress, never
have received the sanction of the States." 180 Senator Edmund Cowan, a Penn-
sylvania Republican, stated that the thirteenth amendment was understood
merely "to liberate the slave from his master."'' Hyman himself wrote that
"George Ticknor Curtis typified a large stream of conservative constitu-
tionalism in his argument that the thirteenth amendment diminished state's
powers not one whit beyond abolition."'' 8 2 I would not hobble Hyman with
a call for consistency, but at least he should be called upon to explain his
change of position.
What of Hyman's "larger moral aspirations of the abolitionist movement?"
C. Vann Woodward noted that during the war years "the great majority of
citizens in the North still abhorred any association with abolitioniSts" 13 hardly
fertile soil for sowing abolitionist ideology. Senator Cowan ridiculed the no-
tion that the "antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies, that is inborn,
down at the very foundation of our natures," is "to be swept away by a
half-dozen debates and the reading of half a dozen reports from certain aboli-
tionist societies.""'8 Let it be assumed that the radicals in Congress carried
the abolitionist flag. But Hyman's disciple, M.L. Benedict, concluded that
"the nonradicals had enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of
some radicals and over the opposition of many."' 85 David Donald explains
that "moderates had to check extreme Radical proposals or be defeated in
the districts they represented."'86 An early and ardent proponent of judicial
activism, Howard Jay Graham, acknowledged that "the early antislavery usages
and racial-humanitarian expansion and coverage before the Civil War had
been forgotten and eclipsed during Reconstruction."'8 7 Such statements are
amply confirmed by the debates on the fourteenth amendment. It will therefore
179. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1866).
180. Id. at 1255.
181. Id. at 499.
182. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 428 (1973).
183. C.V. WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 73 (1960). For additional cita-
tions, see R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 235.
184. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866). George Julian, an Indiana radical, lamented
that "[tihe real trouble is we hate the Negroes." Id. at 257. For citations to other such statements,
see R. BERGER, supra note I, at 13.
185. M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 210 (1975). Senator John Sherman boasted
in Cincinnati in September 1866, while the amendment was up for ratification, "we defeated
every radical proposition in it." J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 167
(1965).
186. D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 51-52 (1970).
187. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 264 (1968).
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be instructive to learn how Hyman shows that abolitionist thinking influenced
the Framers beyond the narrow confines of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
was deemed to be "identical" with the fourteenth amendment.
8
Such are the materials whereby Richards would demonstrate that my "use
of history is extremely confined and narrow," to charge me with
"historiographical distortion in the use of sources."' 8 9 Allied to imperviousness
to undeniable facts is Richards' own persistent distortions. Thus in referring
to the theory of constitutional interpretivism espoused by Michael Perry and
Berger, he says it is "used also by other recent constitutional theorists" and
"highly controversial,"' 9" implying that interpretivism is a new-fangled theory.
But as another activist, Thomas Grey, wrote, the "interpretivist" view is
"deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of political
legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law."' 9' Two
of its leading components, effectuation of the Framers' intention and of the
meaning of the common law terms they employed, stretch back to the very
beginnings of the nation. Only since academicians have attempted to erect
a facade of rationality for the decisions of the Warren Court'92 has "inter-
pretivism" become "highly controversial."' 93 Again, Richards misleadingly
attributes to me the constitutional test of what the Framers "would have in-
cluded or excluded."' 9 Prophecy is not for me; instead I supplied massive
documentation for what the Framers did exclude, e.g., they excluded suf-
frage and segregation in 1866; they excluded death penalties from "cruel and
unusual punishments" in 1789, as is attested by the Act of 1790. To transmute
such facts into Berger's "assimilation of legal interpretation to the explana-
188. See supra text accompanying note 85, and R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 22-23.
189. Richards, supra note 4, at 1389-90.
190. Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
191. Grey, Do We have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975). Ely
acknowledges that the interpretivist argument "stretches back" to Hamilton and Marshall, and
"seems to enjoy virtually universal contemporary acceptance." Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism:
Its Impossibility and Allure, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 411 (1978). How can that be "impossible" to
which the Court has professed allegiance for almost 200 years?
192. Activist writings are "plainly designed to protect the legacy of the Warren Court." Tushnet,
Legal Realism, Structural Review and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809, 811 (1983). Stanely
Kutler termed this a "new faith." Kutler, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 513 (1979).
193. Richards remarks that "in hard cases, the proper interpretation of the legal convention
is extremely controversial: Precedents conflict or are ambiguous, relevant historical materials
are unclear or controversial . . . ." Richards, supra note 4, at 1377. He prefers speculating
about "the flowers that bloom in the Spring, tra la" to addressing the unmistakable exclusion
of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment and the narrow scope given the amendment in the
Civil Rights Cases, supra text accompanying note 85, which was not "ambiguous."
Paul Brest, an activist guru, recently examined the views of "seven representative [activist]
scholars," and found they espoused different theories, disagreeing even when "employing essen-
tially the same methodology"; and even when they agreed, "their conclusions are not obviously
determined by their sources or methods," suggesting they were tied to their several predilections.
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Fssential Contradictions of Normative Con-
stitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1089 (1981).
194. Richards, supra note 4, at 1378 (emphasis added).
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tion of the subjective purposes of the Founders or legislators""'9 is utterly
to misrepresent my reliance on what the Framers said and how they voted,
not on speculation as to their mental states. Sweet is a philosopher's use of
history.
INTERPRETATION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Richards' discourse on interpretation is a verbal masquerade, garbed in what
George Orwell called "doublespeak."' 96 Legal interpretation, he asserts, "is
embedded in larger moral and political ideals of just and good government," 97
by which he must mean his own ideals. For he reproaches the seven-member
majority of the Court for rejecting the minority's insistence on abolition of
the death penalty, and the people for ignorant "retributivism." Why should
we prefer his ideals of "just and good government" to those expressed by
the Framers in the Constitution, which have served us well for 200 years in
a world swept by revolution? His goal, which he calls "metainterpretation"
is "to assess which approach to legal interpretation most naturally advances
the beliefs . ..of the legal community in a coherent and sensible way."'' 9 8
Does he refer to current illuminati who would rationalize judicial revision
of the Constitution,' 99 or to the Anglo-American "legal community" who
over a period of 800 years developed a "coherent and sensible way" of
interpretation? 211 If, as he states, "interpretative questions ultimately appeal
to morality of political community," ' ' he has failed to explain the death
penalty, school prayer and like decisions to which the community is plainly
hostile.
Richards cannot bring himself boldly, like Paul Brest, to challenge "the
assumption that judges are bound by the Constitution,"202 to state forthrightly
that the people are unfit to govern themselves and therefore the nine, oft-
195. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). It is Richards who inquires what the Founders would have
done in modem circumstances. See infra text accompanying note 211.
196. See supra introductory epigraph.
197. Richards, supra note 4, at 1379-80.
198. Id. at 1377-78.
199. Academicians, Mark Tushnet wrote, are "eager to superimpose a facade of rationality
on the Court's decision." Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way: An Interpretation
of Public Law Scholarship, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1325 (1979).
200. Justice Story asked how a statute is "to be interpreted? Are the rules of the common
law to furnish the proper guide, or is every court and department to give it any interpretation
it may please, according to its own arbitrary will?" 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF T=E UNITED STATES § 155 n.2 (5th ed. 1905). His contemporary, Chancellor Kent,
warned against leaving courts "to a dangerous discretion to roam at large in the trackless fields
of their own imaginations." J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).
So too, Hamilton explained that "to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispen-
sable that they be bound down by strict rules which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case." TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
201. Richards, supra note 4, at 1378 n.26.
202. Brest, supra note 81, at 224.
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times five, Platonic Guardians must take over the task.213 Instead he prefers
"the precious coinage of independent judicial elaboration of principle" to
"the counterfeit of obedience to Founders' application which may lack sense
or reasonableness. ' 20 4 Another activist, Mark Tushnet, however, acknowledges
that the view, "we are indeed better off being bound by the dead hand of
the past than being subject to the whims of willful judges trying to make
the Constitution live," is "fairly powerful. ' 2 5 What Richards calls the
Founders' "applications," as we have seen, are in reality the limited delega-
tions they made, principles rather than applications. This misnomer enables
him to claim that "applications unimaginable earlier may become reasonable,
and earlier applications may become unreasonable. ' 2 6 If, as is undeniable,
suffrage was excluded from the fourteenth amendment, the fact that exclu-
sion of suffrage is now deemed unreasonable does not empower the Court
to rewrite the amendment. Expansion of suffrage required a series of
amendments.
Richards maintains that "it is not a reasonable construction of the abstract
language employed to limit it forever to its historic denotations." 0 7 This would,
however, upend the centuries-old rule that the text must yield to the intention
of the Draftsmen.200 Against this Richards cites Home Builders & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell,20 ' which sustained a mortgage moratorium during
the Depression. "Hard cases make bad law," said Holmes.210 Richards opines
that the Founders would not have construed the contract clause to preclude
relief in "modern circumstances." 2"' They were faced by precisely such
circumstances-debtors' outcries for relief, and they adopted the contract clause
203. Learned Hand, one of the wisest of judges, rejected rule by Platonic Guardians. L. HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1962).
204. Richards, supra note 4, at 1388.
205. Tushnet, supra note 53, at 787.
206. Richards, supra note 4, at 1381.
207. Id. For Richards, "the language of the clauses ('cruel and unusual punishments,' 'equal
protection of the law') is itself abstract." Id. at 1380. Nevertheless, 300 years of exclusion of
death penalties from "cruel and unusual punishments" removes abstractness in that particular.
See supra note 14. Nor can he render "equal protection of the laws" abstract in light of the
framers' unmistakable intention to bar across-the-board equality and confine themselves to shielding
a narrow category of rights. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
Richards' resort to "abstract" poses another difficulty. "In general ...abstract connotes
apartness from reality and often lack of specific application to actual things." WEBSTER'S NEw
DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 8 (1968). Consequently it cannot cut down the rights reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment, e.g., administration of local criminal law. For such diminution
a clear intention is needed. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872); see also
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
208. See supra note 14.
209. 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Richards, supra note 4, at 1381. A liberal is uncomfortable to find
himself in the company of the dissenting Four Horsemen, but as Sidney Hook wrote, "[wlhat
makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence for it." S. HooK, PmLosoPHY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 12 (1980).
210. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
211. Richards, supra note 4, at 1381.
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to protect creditors against impairment."'2 Of such reasoning that "if the
Founding Fathers had grown up in the twentieth century, and had all our
experiences, and perceived the problem from our vantage point, they would
decide the case the way [we would decide it]," Justice Richard Neely wrote:
"[T]hat is an interesting, but hardly reassuring approach to applying the man-
date of a written constitutional document." ' 3
Be it assumed that the disastrous impact of the Depression on repayment
of mortgages constrained the Court to breach constitutional bounds, the hang-
ing of a fairly tried, undoubted murderer presents no such national emer-
gency. Richards' citation of Blaisdell confirms Hamilton's prescient caution
in Federalist No. 25: "[E]very breach of the fundamental laws, through dic-
tated by necessity . . forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
necessity does not exist at all." 21 ' From such unpromising materials Richards
distils the proposition that we must not "impute an irrational or self-defeating
purpose in the way that counterfactual application of constitutional language
may demand, unless clear evidence so requires. In the case of the American
Constitution ('a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come'), there
is no such evidence." 2 '5 What "irrational or self-defeating purpose" is ex-
hibited, for instance, by the Framers' exclusion of suffrage from the four-
teenth amendment? The exclusion of suffrage for women survived into the
twentieth century. What is "counterfactual" about the "clear evidence" that
exclusion was "irrefutably" the Framers' purpose? Richards' statement that
"there is no such evidence" is itself grossly "counterfactual"; he is betrayed
by his penchant for overstatement.
212. In the convention, Madison referred to "the necessity of providing more effectively for
the security of private rights .... Interference with these were evils which had more perhaps
than anything else, produced this convention." M. FARRANI, supra note 51, at 133. The rights
he would secure were those of creditors against debtors. Thus he adverted to "[a] rage ... for
an abolishing of debts ... an improper and wicked project." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62
(J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). Hamilton condemned "[1]aws in violation of private con-
tracts," id. No. 7, at 40. Madison noted American weariness with "legislative interferences in
cases affecting personal rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 29 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed.
1937). See also supra text accompanying note 46. "Above all," Martin Diamond observed, "the
delegates agreed in fearing the tendency in many of the states to agrarian and debtors' measures
that seemed to threaten the security of property." Diamond, What the Framers Meant by
Federalism, in A NATION OF STATES 24, 33 (R. Goldwin ed. 1963). The "constitution put a stop-
per on those leveling and confiscatory demands of democracy by making contracts sacred, by
prohibiting paper money .... S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, Tim GROWTH OF THE AmERICAN
REPUBLIC 300 (1950).
213. R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AmERICA 11 (1981). "One must be on his guard against
recreating history by hindsight and attributing to the language of an early legal doctrine the
implications which the evolution of experience has put into it."-F. FRANKFURTER, THE CoM-
mERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARsItALL-TAN'aY Am WArrm 60 (1937). In other words, Professor Richards,
do not seek cover for your current aspirations in the allegedly "abstract" language the Framers
employed; admit that you would have the Court read your predilections into the terms they
employed to limit their delegations. See Brest, infra text accompanying note 280.
214. Tim FEDERALIST No. 25, at 158 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
215. Richards, supra note 4, at 1381-82.
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Let me call a few historical facts to Richards' attention. Fearful of power, 216
the Founders resorted to a written Constitution in order to limit it.2'7 That
posited, as Philip Kurland reminded us, that it was to have a "fixed and
unchanging meaning," alterable only by amendment.2"8 The Constitution, to
borrow from Jefferson, was meant to "bind down" our delegates "from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution."2 '9 Chief Justice Marshall, who
spoke for judicial review in the Virginia Ratification Convention, declared
that a written Constitution was designed to define and limit power, and asked,
"to what purpose are powers limited . . . if those limits may, at any time
be passed by those intended to be restrained. '220 We "obediently" observe
the Founders' limits2 ' on the power they delegated because of an abiding
distrust of power. "No organ" of government, Marshall declared in Mar-
bury v. Madison, may alter the Constitution; and in rising to the defense
of McCulloch v. Maryland,222 from which Richards heedlessly incants "a Con-
stitution intended to endure for ages to come, ' 223 Marshall categorically denied
that courts were empowered to "change" the instrument. 22 In turning his
back on those limits in the interest of his personal morality, Richards goes
counter to Justice Harlan:
When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the
Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the
amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional
structure which it is its highest duty to protect.
22
'
It will be recalled that Richards rejects "the counterfeit of obedience to
Founders' applications which may lack sense or reasonableness. ' ' 226 Since the
alleged "applications" really represent limits on the written delegations, the
test cannot be their reasonableness in the eyes of Richards and his ilk. The
216. The Founders feared the greedy expansiveness of power, "its endlessly propulsive tendency
to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." B. BAILYN, THn IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AmRcAN REVOLUTION 56-57 (1967).
217. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 179-80 (1803).
218. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CoNsTITtroN 7 (1978). Justice William Paterson,
a leading framer, declared "[tihe Constitution is certain and fixed ... and can be revoked or
altered only by the authority "that made it." Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
219. 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1836).
220. See supra note 217.
221. See supra text accompanying note 204.
222. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
223. Richards, supra note 4, at 1381-82.
224. G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (1969). Chief
Justice Hughes also leaned heavily on this Marshall dictum in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934). Gerald Gunther commented, "[i]f virtually unlimited con-
gressional [or judicial discretion] is required to meet twentieth century needs, candid argument to
that effect, rather than ritual invoking of Marshall's authority, would seem to me more clearly
in accord with the Chief Justice's stance." G. GUNTmR, supra, at 20-21.
225. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
226. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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Founders, in fact, distinguished constitutionality from "reasonableness"; James
Wilson said in the Convention, "[l]aws may be unjust, may be unwise, may
be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not so unconstitutional as to justify
the judges in refusing to give them effect.""22 "Judicial elaboration of princi-
ple," on which Richards repeatedly descants, 221 is one of his doublespeak terms.
What elaboration of principle was involved in the 1970s' overthrow of the
uninterrupted, judicially sanctioned employment of death penalties? No court
prior thereto had questioned the constitutionality of death penalties. That rever-
sal surely does not exemplify a "tradition of judicial elaboration," of "ex-
plicating the traditions of judicial elaboration of these constitutional values
in case law over time. '229 The same may be said about the Court's very belated
discovery that school prayers were outlawed by the first amendment, that
migrant indigents were entitled to public support from the moment that they
arrived at the terminus. Such judicial amendment, the Court itself said, lies
beyond its power: the Constitution may not be "amended by judicial deci-
sion without action by the designated organs in the mode by which alone
amendments can be made.) 230
Let me further document my charge that Richards engages in doublespeak.
He proposes to justify "contemporary constitutional doctrine [Justice Douglas'
"gut" reactions23 'I by using more abstract principles that may unite 'original
understanding' with later judicial elaborations .... 9232 It is sheer sophistry
to "unite" the "one man-one vote" decisions wherein the Court reversed the
"original understanding" that suffrage was excluded from the fourteenth
amendment with that exclusion. This is repudiation, not elaboration. Con-
sider, too, Richards' "plausible inferences about the common sense applica-
tions of 'equal protection of the law' in 1868 may confuse abstract arguments
of principle with historically contingent and shifting conceptions of applica-
tion and thus lead to wrong judgments about the principle involved. 21 3  That
227. 2 M. FAAND, supra note 51, at 73.
228. Richards, supra note 4, at 1380, 1388, 1397.
229. Id. at 1380, 1382. Richards refers again "to the traditions of judicial review which have
construed constitutional language over time." Richards, supra note 4, at 1382. That tradition
was also violated by the "one man-one vote" decisions, see supra note 15. When Richards would
"hesitate to use" the Founders' intent to undercut the legitimacy of . . . (traditions of judicial
review over time) unless there-is strongest evidence of inconsistency and good reason to believe
that one kind of data invokes the more authoritative purposes of the system," and concludes
"there are no such weighty reasons," Richard, supra note 4, at 1382-83, he is refuted by the
facts. The Framers' unmistakable exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment is "the
more authoritative purpose" if we are to live under a Constitution rather than according to
the whims of judges.
230. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892); See also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221,
227 (1920); "[I]t is not the function of the courts . . . to alter the method [for change] which
the Constitution has fixed."
231. Justice Douglas recounted that "the 'gut' reaction of a judge at the level of constitu-
tional adjudication . . . was the main ingredient of his decision." W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEAus 1939-1975 8 (1981).
232. Richards, supra note 4, at 1375.
233. Id. at 1389.
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the 1866 Framers did not intend by "equal protection" to create an "abstract
principle" of across-the-board equality23 ' is evidenced by their repeated rejec-
tion of a bar to all discrimination, buttressed by the testimony of the outstan-
ding leaders, Senator William Fessenden and Thaddeus Stevens, and confirmed
by the judgment of the contemporary, Justice Bradley.235 A sweeping "abstract
principle" cannot be wrung from an unmistakably limited design. The notion
that the Framers' unequivocal intention to limit their reforms is merely an
expression of "contingent and shifting conceptions ' 2 36 that are not binding
on this generation merely seeks to lodge in the judges' power to reverse the
Framers' determinations. No such power was conferred on the judges; it was
exclusively reserved to the people.
Consider also Richards' "the determinacy of the denotation of the 'original
understanding' may become equivocal or ambiguous, even be utterly dis-
counted, because the explanation provided by basic arguments of principle
frame our interpretation in a more convincing and reasonable way." ' 231 No
amount of theorizing can render the "irrefutable" exclusion of suffrage
"equivocal or ambiguous" except to one determined to escape from the bonds
of that exclusion. Richards lets the cat out of the bag in stating, "the appeal
to Founders' applications misconceives the proper role of the judiciary in the
elaboration of the abstract intentions of relevant constitutional clauses precisely
in ways that reinterpret Founders' applications, and sometimes abandon them
entirely. ' 238 To "abandon" an intention, abstract or not, is hardly to
"elaborate" it. He ever prefers judges to the Founders, 23 9 his real objective
being to rationalize the Court's assumption of power to amend the Constitu-
tion for purposes dear to him and to take over from the "ignorant" people
their right to govern themselves.
234. Thus Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio assured the Framers that the Civil Rights Bill secures
"equality of protection in those enumerated rights which the States may deem proper to confer
upon any race." CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1866); see R. BERGER, supra note 1,
at 169-71.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79, 85. See also Bell, supra note 75.
236. In rejecting a distinction drawn by Ronald Dworkin, Mark Tushnet stated, he "can be
required to produce evidence ... that the framers knew that they were enacting provisions that
embodied a moral content richer than their own moral conceptions .... The distinction relies
on modern theories of law that, I am certain, were quite foreign indeed probably incomprehensi-
ble to the framers." Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HAuv. L. REv. 781, 791 (1983).
237. Richards, supra note 4, at 1387 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 1396 (emphasis added).
239. See Richards, supra note 229. Richards says, "in conflicts between judicial convention
and Founders' intent it is the former, not the latter, which should govern," Richards, supra
note 4, at 1384, flying in the teeth of an abiding distrust of judicial discretion. WOOD, supra
note 30, at 299, 304. Hurst, Discussion in Suranss CouR AND SuPRmE LAW 75 (E. Cahn
ed. 1954): "A very basic principal of our constitutionalism... [is] a distrust of official power."
Richards' view does nof coincide with the Court's professions. As Robert Bork pointed out,
"value choices are attributed [by the Court] to the Founding Fathers, not to the Court." Bork,
supra not 15, at 4. And in a mouth-filling exhortation Richards opts "for the precious coinage
of independent judicial elaboration of principle" against "the counterfeit of obedience to Founders'
applications which may lack sense or reasonableness." Richards, supra note 4, at 1388.
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Richards' incantation of "abstract" intention or principle is merely another
attempt to escape the bonds of the "original understanding" by lifting the
level of abstraction, a device whereby one can arrive at any result one pleases.""
It is as illusory as a magician's trick of levitation. Tushnet cogently asks,
"why describe the concept of equality on a level of generality so high that
it obliterates the specific intention to permit segregation? ' 241 That is its very
purpose. The process whereby one distils that larger "abstract intention" is
described by Richards as "the Herculean excavation of background rights. ' 24 "
To illustrate he cites "Brandeis' excavation of the right of privacy, as underly-
ing various extant rights of property, tort, copyright, and unfair competition,
thus resonating an independent right of tort and, eventually, constitutional
law. '2 4 3 Richards leaps from crag to crag as nimbly as a mountain goat. To
deduce a tort principle of privacy from tort and property law is one thing;
to balloon it into a constitutional command is something else again. This is
not "excavation" in the Constitution or its history, but a judicial construct
out of thin air."' "Privacy as an all encompassing constitutional right was
not a part of the legal tradition inherited from England or the
colonies . . . .' I' Nor did it faintly "resonate" in the several constitutional
conventions. Philip Kurland justly stated that "the right of privacy" is no
part of the Constitution; it evidences "deconstruction by label." 4 "
We have seen the implausibility of Richards' reliance on "the Titus Oates
affair" to illustrate "abstract intentions implicit in the salient history" of
240. Jacques Barzun observes that "abstractions form a ladder which takes the climber into
the.clouds, where diagnostic differences disappear," adding that "at a high enough rung in the
ladder of abstraction disparate things become the same: a song and spinning top are, after all,
but two ways of setting air waves in motion." J. BARZUN, supra note 3, at 59, 65. "Why...
philosophers should have vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particulars and
in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand ... [for] the things of worth are all
concrete and singular." Id. at 58.
241. Tushnet, supra note 53, at 791.
242. Richards, supra note 4, at 1387.
243. Richards, The Aims of Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTON L. RaV. 723, n.58 (1983).
244. Consider Richards' "the judiciary's role should be to articulate the moral sense of abstract
principles [the product of 'Herculean excavation'] of just government in contemporary cir-
cumstances." Richards, supra note 4, at 1397. His fellow activist, Robert Cover, more brazenly
asserts that "we" have entrusted to the judiciary, never mind the Constitution, the task of fashion-
ing an "ideology" whereby to measure the reasonableness of legislation. Cover, Book Review,
NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27.
Now and then Richards lets his hair down, as when he criticizes Michael Perry for rejecting
"the liberal interpretive approaches of those who defend judicial expansion of human rights
... without the full intellectual justification which he believes a complete defense requires (Dworkin.
Richards [citations omitted]." Richards, supra note 4, at 1374. If the result pleases Messrs. Dworkin
and Richards, bother an adequate "intellectual justification." This is the "gut" reaction school.
It is widely agreed that such expansion is without constitutional warrant. For citations see Berger,
Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "Court-Stripping" Polemic,
44 Omo ST. L.J. 611, n.44 (1983).
245. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 266-67
(1983).
246. Kurland, Some Comments on the Divine Right of King's Courts "To Say What the Law
Is," 23 ARIz. L. Rav. 581, 592 (1981).
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the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause.247 His derivation of an abstract
principle of free speech though not as far-fetched is also ahistorical. He notes
that "Leonard Levy's classic study of the history of the free speech clause
indicates that, as of 1791, the clause would have been applied to licensing
as a condition of publication [i.e., prior restraint] but not to state prosecution
for political criticism of the government after publication (seditious libel).) 24 8
Taking issue with Michael Perry's view that this original understanding denotes
that the modern expansion of free speech is noninterpretive, i.e., importing
extraconstitutional values, he remarks,
perhaps,24 ' in 1791, the common interpretation of the liberty of free speech
would, following Milton's Areopagita, have focussed on licensing, not on
seditious libel. But if one inquires into the basis or ground for Milton's
objections, it might appear, on deeper examination of his argument here
and in the related areas of religious liberty and anti-establishment religion,
that the underlying principle is the guarantee of independent rational con-
science, which would naturally express itself in a general prohibition of
state-imposed restrictions on speech content. 211
Once more Richards overstates his case because remedies for libel remain
available to individuals,2"' undermining his "general prohibition of state im-
posed restrictions on speech content." And though libel against the govern-
ment became the subject of acrimonious political debate between Federalists
and Jeffersonians, the Alien and Sedition Act was signed by John Adams,
no sinister Caesar, and was sustained by a number of contemporary courts.252
It therefore constitutes a respectable judgment that libel against the govern-
ment lay outside the prohibition of the first amendment, and in fact, it
represented contemporary thinking. Leonard Levy tells us that "the security
of the state against libelous advocacy or attack was always regarded as
outweighing any social interest in social expression, at least through the period
of the adoption of the First Amendment." 215 The prevalent view was that
individual rights were outweighed by the interests of the collective commu-
nity. The eighteenth century colonists punished with "severe strictness any
seditious libels against the representatives of the people in the colonial
assemblies. ' 2 4 To discover in such thinking a "deeper" principle which ig-
nores its limited goals is to "impose upon the past a creature of
247. See supra note 138 and text accompanying notes 136-38.
248. Richards, supra note 4, at 1386.
249. This "perhaps" characteristically suggests doubt where none exists. Blackstone stated,
"[t]he liberty of the press ... consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when publiched." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 148, at 151-52 (quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)).
250. Richards, supra note 4, at 1386-87 (emphasis added).
251. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 715.
252. The Act's validity "was sustained by the lower federal courts and by three Supreme Court
Justices sitting on circuit." Norman Dorsen, quoted by M. PERRY, THE CoNSIT oN, Ta CoURTS,
AND HuMAN RIGHTs 196 n.32 (1982).
253. Quoted by id.
254. G. WOOD, supra note 30, at 63.
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our own imaginings," 2"5 Richards' besetting scholarly sin. If we are to repudiate
the presuppositions of the Founders, let it be done candidly and openly, not
by Richards' circumlocutious double speak.
Essentially Richards' "abstract" principles or intentions, like his other
arguments, seek to set the constitutional terms adrift, cut off from the com-
mon law meaning they had at the adoption of the Constitution or the mean-
ing given them by the Framers. Why this "Herculean" endeavor: to achieve
his desire for abolition of death penalties though abolition was rejected by
the Court.
CONCLUSION
Richards' socio-philosophical attempt to undergird judicial revision of the
Constitution would jettison the Court's long settled canons of construction,
e.g., effectuation of the Framers' intention, respect for contemporaneous con-
structions long acquiesced in and the like, and confer upon the Courts power
withheld by the Framers. As such it is a blueprint for one man's dream house,
but it bears small resemblance to the existing structure. Apparently he is
unaware of the implications of the constitutional terms he employs. Consider:
The basic institutions of the American republic correspond to deep themes
of democratic political theory: federalism with its complex structure of
representation; the separation of powers with its controlling conception
of the rule of law, judicial supremacy based on a charter of basic human
rights. 2"'
Federalism, to begin with, postulates the maintenance of state control over
local, internal concerns. Madison assured the Ratifiers in the Federalist No.
39 that federal jurisdiction "extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects. ' ' 257 In No. 45 he particularized: [F]ederal powers "will be exercised
principally on external objects as war, peace, negotiation and foreign com-
merce . . . .The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which ... concern ... the internal order ... of the State."' 8 Hamilton
said of the supremacy clause in No. 33 that federal acts which "are invasions
of the residuary powers of the smaller societies .. .will be merely acts of
usurpation and will deserve to be treated as such. ' 25 9 To make such assurances
255. Richardson & Sayles, Parliament and Great Councils in Medieval England, 77 L.Q. Rav.
213, 224 (1961). Justice James Iredell, one of the first Founders to spell out the case for judicial
review, stated, "we are too apt, in estimating a law passed at a remote period, to combine in
our consideration, all the subsequent events which have had an influence upon it, instead of
confining ourselves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances at the time of its pass-
ing." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199, 267 (1796). In "the construction of the language of
the Constitution ...we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the
men who framed that instrument." Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
256. Richards, supra note 4, at 1378, 1385.
257. Tim FEDRALST No. 39, at 249 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
258. Id. at 303.
259. Id. at 202.
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doubly sure, the Founders adopted the tenth amendment, which reserves to
the states all power not delegated to the federal government. 260 When the Court
intrudes into state control of local criminal administration under color of "cruel
and unusual punishments," it violates the very federalism Richards extols.
The "separation of powers," ostensibly respected by Richards, speaks against
judicial intrusion into the legislative domain. Spelled out in the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, it requires that "[t]he judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers" to the end that "it may be a 'government
of laws and not of men."'" 6" In the First Congress, Madison repeated that
the "Judicial shall [never] exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Ex-
ecutive Departments." '262 It is fashionable to defend judicial assumption of
legislative functions on ground of legislative inaction, but as Gerald Gunther
stated, "the view that the courts are authorized to step in when injustices
exist and other institutions fail to act" is "illegitimate." 2 3 Indeed, the Court
itself declared, "it is a breach of the national fundamental law if Congress
gives up its legislative power and transfers it to . . the judicial branch." 2"
What may not be conveyed voluntarily cannot be taken by force majeure.
It is open to Congress to abolish death penalties, but such law making is
outside the judicial province. 26-
"Judicial supremacy based on a charter of basic human rights" is another
figment of Richards' imagination. The judiciary, as Justice James Wilson ex-
plained, was regarded with "aversion and distrust," a survival of British
misrule.2 66 Judicial review was itself an innovation, viewed by many with suspi-
cion, so that Hamilton was driven to assure the Ratifiers that of the three
branches the judiciary "is next to nothing, ' 267 scarcely a medium of
"supremacy." In truth, the people put their trust in their elected represen-
tatives, not judges. "In a republican form of government," Madison stated
in Federalist No. 51, "the legislature necessarily predominates, ' 268 resulting
260. Alpheus Thomas Mason wrote, "opponents of ratification, without a bill of rights, had
conjured up the image of a national colossus, destined to swallow up or destroy the defenseless
states." "To quiet those fears, Madison proposed the Tenth Amendment." A. MASON, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: AN ALMOST FORGOTTEN APPENDAGE, IN THE FUTURE OF OUR LIBERTIES 40 (S.
Halpern ed. 1982). The reservation, the Court stated, was "made absolutely certain by the Tenth
Amendment." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89-90 (1907).
261. 1 BEN POORE, supra note 108, at 960.
262. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 435-36 (2d ed. 1834) (print bearing running head "History of
Congress.").
263. Gunther, supra note 15.
264. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121, 122 (1976) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952)).
265. For the Framers' insistence that "the power of making ought to be kept distinct from
that of expounding the laws," see E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDIcrAL REVIEW 42 (1914).
A leading activist, Charles Black, confirms that for the colonists, "[tihe function of the judge
was thus placed in sharpest antithesis to that of the legislature," who alone was concerned "with
what the law ought to be." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 160 (1960).
266. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WLSON 292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
267. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
268. Id. at 338.
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in what Justice Brandeis described as the deep-seated conviction of the
American people that they "must look to representative assemblies for the
protection of their liberties." '2 69 Judicial review was conceived as a way of
curbing action in excess of constitutional delegations, 270 described by James
Bradley Thayer and Learned Hand as "policing" constitutional boundaries,2 7'
not of displacing legislative action within those bounds,27 2 still less of revising
the Framers' unmistakable intention.
Richards' invocation of the "rule of law" as a controlling aspect of separa-
tion of powers273 also undercuts his reasoning. All Englishmen and colonials
adhered to the rule of law as a basic principle. 274 It postulates, Philip Kurland
points out, that "we are all to be governed by the same pre-established rules
and not by the whim of those charged with executing those rules." 2 5 "Law"
connotes a known rule that should be understood by those whose conduct
it is meant to govern. That can hardly be said of an "abstract principle"
that is the product of a philosopher's "Herculean excavation"-tailored to
his own predilections. "The rule of law is in unsafe hands," said Solicitor
General Robert H. Jackson, "when courts cease to function as courts and
become organs for control of policy."27 6
The social reforms desired by Richards must be made by the people, not
the courts.277 But he knows that the "ignorant" people will not favor his
269. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., dissenting).
270. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 13-16 (1969).
271. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv.
L. REV. 129, 138 (1893); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66, 31 (1962).
272. Justice Iredell drew the line between legislative acts beyond constitutional limitations and
those "within them." With respect to the latter, the legislatures "only exercise a discretion ex-
pressly confided to them .... It is a discretion no more controllable . . .by a Court ...
than a judicial determination is by them." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 266 (1796).
Great weight attaches to this view because Iredell was one of the earliest and foremost advocates
of judicial review. Who should better know its limits?
273. Richards, supra note 4, at 1385.
274. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 171 (1965).
275. Kurland, supra note 246, at 582.
276. R. JACKSON, TRE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 322 (1941). Chief Justice Marshall
averred that "the judicial power is never exercised for giving effect to the will of the Judge;
always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature." Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1924). Henry Monaghan wrote,
any judicial enforcement of norms based on neither text nor structure against the
contrary determination of the political process suffers from two closely intertwined
defects. First, all such efforts reduce themselves to ... the imposition of a judge's
own value preferences on the political organs of government. Second, any such
judicial conduct conflicts with the core constitutional settlement embodied in the
Constitution and reinforced by its amendments-the constitutional scheme of
representative government which assigns policy-making functions to the political
organs of government. These objections seem to be insurmountable . ...
Monaghan, Professor Jones and the Constitution, 4 VT. L. REv. 87, 91 (1979).
277. The Constitution may not be "amended by judicial decision without action by the designated
organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made." McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 36 (1892); see also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
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measures and therefore turns to the courts, 278 which in recent years have been
acting like the "knight errant" Cardozo deplored. 279 His article beautifully
illustrates Brest's adjuration to his activist brethren: "simply to acknowledge
that most of our writings [about judicial review] are not political theory but
advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court
to adopt our various notions of the public good. 2 80
Reference to judicial "whims" has so frequently been made as to deserve
some explication. Consider the recent Supreme Court decision sustaining Con-
gress' employment of a chaplain, in terms that undermine Richards' theoriz-
ing. "Clearly," Chief Justice Burger said,
the men who wrote the First Amendment religion clause did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amend-
ment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without
interruption ever since that early session of Congress.8 '
By that unexceptionable test the Court's resort to "cruel and unusual
punishments" for its strictures against death penalties is indefensible. From
1689 when the English first employed "cruel and unusual punishments" in
their Bill of Rights, through 1789 when the Founders picked up the phrase
in the eighth amendment, to 1972 when the Court first discovered that the
phrase limited administration of death penalties, such penalties, with not a
single exception, were not deemed to be within the phrase. Nevertheless the
Court overturned the centuries-old practice without a qualm, and now exalts
the 200-year chaplain practice on grounds that should have led it to leave
death penalties undisturbed. Such are the vagaries of a Court to whom Richards
would confide our destinies-government by judicial "whim."
The thesis of this response was pithily expressed by the Supreme Court in
the "legislative veto" case: the Framers divided the government
into three defined categories ...to assure, as nearly as possible, that
each Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned respon-
sibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be resisted ...
[To] maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the
power of each Branch must not be eroded."2
278. Joseph Bishop wrote, "[tihose who favor abortion, busing.., and oppose capital punish-
ment ... obviously have no faith whatever in the wisdom and the will of the great majority
of the people, who are opposed to them. They are doing everything possible to have these prob-
lems resolved ... in the courts." Bishop, What is a Liberal-Who is a Conservative, 62 CoM-
MENTARY, Sept., 1976, at 47.
279. A judge "is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." B. CARDozo, THE NATURE
oF Tm JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
280. Brest, supra note 193, at 1109.
281. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3334 (1983).
282. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784, 2787 (1983) (em-
phasis added).
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Although the Court, alas, has not lived by its own counsel, it has nonetheless
uttered an unimpeachable truth. Reformers such as Richards need to recall
Cardozo's caution that reliance on "the individual sense of justice... might
result in a benevolent despotism if the judges were benevolent men. It would
put an end to the reign of law. '2 83 This is what the "rule of law" and the
"separation of powers," that fall so easily from Richards' lips, mean. And
I would remind him that judicial power can be malign as well as benign, as
the laissez faire Court's ill-considered blockade for decades against badly
needed socio-economic reforms attests.
283. B. CAuozo, supra note 279, at 136. In his Farewell Address, Washington advised,
if in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitu-
tional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by amendment in the
way in which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpa-
tion; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must
always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient belief which
the use can at any time yield.
35 G. WASHINGTON, WITINGs 228-29 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).
